Answering questions about consciousness by modeling perception as covert behavior by Markkula, Gustav
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 16 June 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00803
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 803
Edited by:
Juha Silvanto,
University of Westminster, UK
Reviewed by:
Timo Stein,
University of Trento, Italy
Neil Gerald Muggleton,
National Central University, Taiwan
Jacob Jolij,
University of Groningen, Netherlands
*Correspondence:
Gustav Markkula,
Adaptive Systems Group, Division of
Vehicle Engineering and Autonomous
Systems, Department of Applied
Mechanics, Chalmers University of
Technology, Hörsalsvägen 7A, 412 96
Gothenburg, Sweden
gustav.markkula@chalmers.se
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Consciousness Research,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 22 March 2015
Accepted: 27 May 2015
Published: 16 June 2015
Citation:
Markkula G (2015) Answering
questions about consciousness by
modeling perception as covert
behavior. Front. Psychol. 6:803.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00803
Answering questions about
consciousness by modeling
perception as covert behavior
Gustav Markkula *
Adaptive Systems Group, Division of Vehicle Engineering and Autonomous Systems, Department of Applied Mechanics,
Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden
Two main open questions in current consciousness research concern (i) the neural
correlates of consciousness (NCC) and (ii) the relationship between neural activity and
first-person, subjective experience. Here, possible answers are sketched for both of
these, by means of a model-based analysis of what is required for one to admit
having a conscious experience. To this end, a model is proposed that allows reasoning,
albeit necessarily in a simplistic manner, about all of the so called “easy problems”
of consciousness, from discrimination of stimuli to control of behavior and language.
First, it is argued that current neuroscientific knowledge supports the view of perception
and action selection as two examples of the same basic phenomenon, such that one
can meaningfully refer to neuronal activations involved in perception as covert behavior.
Building on existing neuroscientific and psychological models, a narrative behavior model
is proposed, outlining how the brain selects covert (and sometimes overt) behaviors to
construct a complex, multi-level narrative about what it is like to be the individual in
question. It is hypothesized that we tend to admit a conscious experience of X if, at
the time of judging consciousness, we find ourselves acceptably capable of performing
narrative behavior describing X. It is argued that the proposed account reconciles
seemingly conflicting empirical results, previously presented as evidence for competing
theories of consciousness, and suggests that well-defined, experiment-independent
NCCs are unlikely to exist. Finally, an analysis is made of what the modeled narrative
behavior machinery is and is not capable of. It is discussed how an organism endowed
with such a machinery could, from its first-person perspective, come to adopt notions
such as “subjective experience,” and of there being “hard problems,” and “explanatory
gaps” to be addressed in order to understand consciousness.
Keywords: neural correlates of consciousness, first-person subjective experience, perception, action selection,
covert behavior, narrative behavior, heterophenomenology
1. Introduction
The philosophical and scientific discussion of consciousness is age-old, but has also increased
notably in intensity and level of detail during the last few decades, not least thanks to advances
in the neurosciences. Many would argue that achieving a better understanding of consciousness, of
how and why and under what circumstances it occurs, would be a fundamental step forward in our
understanding of what it means to be human. Also, practical and ethical motivations can be raised,
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for example relating to assessing the degree of consciousness of
human patients in comatose states, animals, or even man-built
machines such as robots.
However, despite recent empirical and theoretical progress,
many questions about consciousness remain hotly debated. One
major such debate concerns how to define the neural correlates of
consciousness (NCC), the “minimal neuronal mechanisms jointly
sufficient for any one specific conscious percept” (Tononi and
Koch, 2008, p. 239). A common approach to searching for the
NCC has been the contrastivemethod (Baars, 1988), where brain
activity during consciousness, for example of a visual stimulus,
is contrasted with brain activity where consciousness is deemed
to be lacking, generally because of a missing subjective report,
for example a button press, in response to the stimulus. Many
experiments of this type have been carried out (see e.g., Leopold
and Logothetis, 1996; Srinivasan et al., 1999; Sergent et al.,
2005; Lau and Passingham, 2006; Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010;
Pitts et al., 2012; Li et al., 2014), but variations in experimental
paradigms, brain imaging techniques, and analysis methods have
engendered seemingly conflicting results, which have been taken
to support competing, markedly different hypotheses regarding
the nature of the NCC (e.g., Tononi, 2004, 2012; Dehaene et al.,
2006, 2014; Lamme, 2006, 2010; Block, 2009; Lau and Rosenthal,
2011).
One possible reason for the lack of consensus regarding the
NCC could be that researchers have thus far not taken sufficient
care to separate the brain activity involved in the actual conscious
awareness (the NCC proper) from brain activity corresponding
to prerequisites for or consequences of that awareness (Aru
et al., 2012; de Graaf et al., 2012). However, some researchers
and philosophers argue that even if neuroscientists could reach
perfect agreement on the NCC, there would still remain an
explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) regarding “why the neural basis
of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather
than another experience or no experience at all” (Block, 2009,
p. 1111), and that explaining a mere function or ability such as
discrimination and reporting of a stimulus does not solve the
hard problem: explaining the first-person, subjective experience of
that stimulus (Chalmers, 1995). This allegedly unexplained aspect
of consciousness is sometimes referred to as the qualia, the “raw
feels,” such as “the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon,
smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky” (Jackson,
1982, p. 127), the “what it is like” (Nagel, 1974).
Whether or not there is such an explanatory gap to be bridged,
or equivalently such a hard problem to be solved, is the topic of
another major debate in contemporary writing on consciousness.
Many have argued that these gaps and problems are illusions,
arising from dualistic thinking or otherwise misguided intuitions
(e.g., Dennett, 1991; O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Blackmore, 2012),
and that something like qualia, such as discussed by the authors
cited above, cannot exist (Dennett, 1988), at least not within the
scope of science (Cohen and Dennett, 2011). Dennett (1991) has
suggested what he calls the heterophenomenological approach to
consciousness, whereby rather than asking questions like “why
do we have qualia?,” which implicitly assume that first-person
accounts of consciousness are true, we should ask questions like
“why do we say that we have qualia?.” Blackmore (2012, 2015)
has argued that even the very search for NCC bears the mark of
dualistic thinking and is therefore bound for failure. O’Regan and
Noë (2001) also deny the existence of qualia, and have proposed
a behavior-oriented account of consciousness, whereby conscious
experience amounts to active and task-oriented prediction of how
sensory inputs will change with motor actions: “It is confused
to think of the qualitative character of experience in terms of
the occurrence of something (whether in the mind or brain).
Experience is something we do and its qualitative features are
aspects of this activity” (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 960). This
way of talking about consciousness comes rather close to the
behaviorist (Skinner, 1984) and behavior analysis (Pierce and
Cheney, 2004) traditions.
This paper aims to contribute to the two debates regarding
(i) the NCC and (ii) first-person subjective consciousness, with
an argument that is inspired from and related to those of
Dennett, Blackmore, O’Regan, Noë, and others. The main means
for extending beyond these previous contributions will be a
model that, while simplistic, allows structured reasoning about
both perception and consequent overt behavior, for example in
terms of subjective reports about perceptions. A foundational
observation behind this narrative behavior model is that current
neuroscience construes both perception and selection of overt
actions as rather similar in terms of the underlying neural
mechanisms. The model therefore also helps clarify what one
could mean by talking about perception as a form of behavior.
It will then be illustrated how the narrative behavior model
can be put to use in a heterophenomenological approach to
consciousness: It will be proposed that we tend to say that we are
having a conscious experience of X precisely when we attempt
to exhibit a covert narrative behavior describing X, and find
ourselves capable of doing so. This proposal will be tested against
some existing empirical findings from contrastive experiments,
previously used to support competing hypotheses about the
NCC, and it will be argued that apparent conflicts between these
findings are resolved by the proposed account of consciousness.
Specifically, the proposed account predicts that there need not
be any well-defined, paradigm-independent NCCs to be found
at the putative moment of conscious experience, and that any
(approximate) common neural denominators should rather be
sought around the moment of judging consciousness.
Finally, it will be argued that an organism functioning in
accordance with the narrative behavior model would, given
its narrative abilities and inabilities, have good reasons for
thinking about its own “subjective experience” as something
rather astonishing, enigmatic, and non-physical, such that the
narrative behavior model could help explain the human tendency
for postulating explanatory gaps and hard problems.
2. Shared Brain Mechanisms in Action
Selection and Perception
It is not common to talk about (i) selection of overt actions
and (ii) perception, as in discrimination, classification, and to
some extent interpretation of sensory stimuli, as being two
examples of the same basic phenomenon. However, they have
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often been modeled quite similarly. This is especially clear
in cases where the same mathematical model has been used
for both. One such example is available from Deco and Rolls
(2004, 2005), who have used a framework based on the concept
of biased competition (see Figure 1A) to recreate a number
of both more perception-oriented and more action-oriented
experimental paradigms. In their simulations, pools of neurons,
encoding for example a stimulus classification (i.e., perception)
or a motor action (i.e., action selection), compete for activation
by lateral inhibition between pools, biased by external excitation
either bottom-up, e.g., from sensory input to which the pools
are tuned, or top-down, e.g., signifying that what the pools
are encoding (the stimulus classification or the motor action)
is requested in the current task context. Using this type of
model, it has been possible to explain various brain activation
phenomena observed in object recognition paradigms (Deco
and Rolls, 2004) and to reproduce observed overt behavior in
paradigms with flexible stimulus-response mappings (Deco and
Rolls, 2005). Zylberberg et al. (2010) have studied a similar
computational model, integrating both elements of perception
and action selection into one and the same neural simulation.
Another modeling framework that has been used to explain
and predict empirical observations both in visual perception
and selection of motor actions is dynamical field theory (DFT),
which also relies heavily on the idea of lateral inhibition between
competing percepts or overt behaviors (Schöner et al., 1997;
Johnson et al., 2008). See also the model of attention selection
proposed by Engström (2008). Engström did not emphasize
similarity between perception and action selection, but his model
provided the starting point for what is being sketched here.
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustrations of the suggested shared neural
mechanisms underlying perception and selection of overt action. (A)
Biased competition. In perception, A1 and A2 could for example be CAT and
LION, or the two alternative ways to perceive a Necker cube. In action
selection, they could be LOOK AT ROAD AHEAD and LOOK AT CELL
PHONE or MAKE TEA and DO NOT MAKE TEA. Typically, the nodes are also
modeled as self-excitatory (Schöner et al., 1997; Deco and Rolls, 2004,
2005; Johnson et al., 2008), an aspect that will be left implicit throughout this
paper. (B) Converging hierarchy, with the gray circles representing
surrounding nodes not immediately involved in the current example. In
perception, A1 could be LION, deduced from intermediate-level perceptual
representations in the Bi (speculatively, for example CAT-LIKE, LARGE SIZE,
SAND-COLORED, etc.), in turn deduced from the Ci , low-level perceptual
representations of edges, colors, movement, etc. In action selection, A1
could be MOVE HAND TO GRASP KETTLE, B1 = EXTEND ARM, B2 =
OPEN HAND, and the Ci low-level motor commands to achieve these
movements. An example where some or all actions cannot be performed
simultaneously, thus inhibit each other, and must be performed sequentially
or interleaved, could be A1 = MAKE TEA, B1 = BOIL WATER, B2 = ADD
TEA-BAG TO CUP, C1 = FILL POT WITH WATER, C2 = PUT POT ON
STOVE, C3 = GRASP TEA-BAG, C4 = PUT TEA-BAG IN CUP, and so on.
(C) Guided activation. Prefrontal cortex (PFC) provides top-down bias
resulting in activation (the orange shading of the nodes) of a non-routine
mapping from stimulus S to response R2, rather than the stronger (the
thicker arrows), routine mapping from S to R1. (D) Summary overview of
shared mechanisms for perception and action selection. Biased competition
in a converging hierarchy, growing from reward-based and associative
learning, with PFC providing additional top-down bias when needed. The line
pattern behind the nodes is intended to illustrate the idea that closer to the
sensory and motor surfaces (receptors and effectors) the functional hierarchy
can be traced more clearly in the neuronal hierarchy, whereas further away
from these surfaces, there can be considerable neural overlap between
separate functional nodes. Note the similarity to the model of for example
Fuster (2000).
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The basic idea of biased competition arose from the study
of visual attention (Desimone and Duncan, 1995), but has since
found empirical corroboration as an actual brain mechanism
not only in sensory processing of visual (Kastner et al., 1998;
Bichot et al., 2005), auditory, and tactile stimuli (Porcu et al.,
2014), but indeed also in selection of overt motor actions (Pastor-
Bernier and Cisek, 2011). Thus, behavioral and neural data
align to suggest that biased competition may be an important
part of both how we settle on what percepts to extract from
our sensory input, and how we settle on what overt actions to
perform.
When talking about bias to these competitions coming “top-
down” or “bottom-up,” a logical next step is to consider what, in
the brain, is sending these biasing signals. One possible answer,
attractive in its parsimony, would be: other competitions, at
other levels in a hierarchy. Indeed, in visual object recognition,
a converging hierarchical brain organization, as illustrated in
Figure 1B, is part of the textbook description (see e.g., Bear
et al., 2001), with neurons in early visual areas in occipital
cortex responding for example to edges of specific orientations
at specific spatial locations in the visual field, and neurons in
later areas along the ventral pathway down onto the temporal
cortex responding to increasingly complex features or objects,
with increasingly overlapping spatial receptive fields. (This
hierarchical progression, from V1 to IT, is also part of the
abovementioned object recognition model of Deco and Rolls,
2004).
In motor control, the view of behavior as hierarchically
organized, with goals and performance being represented and
controlled at different hierarchical levels, goes back at least to
Bernstein in the 1940s (Latash and Latash, 1994), and functional
models of behavior built on this type of assumption have been
able to generate complex behaviors with concurrent goals at
different time scales (e.g., tea-making; cf. Figure 1B), while at the
same time reproducing typical mistakes observed during such
behavior (Cooper and Shallice, 2000, 2006; Crump and Logan,
2010). In line with this type of model, a single pointwise electrical
stimulation of primary motor cortex can trigger seemingly goal-
directed movements, such as reaching for a specific location
in space (Graziano et al., 2005; Graziano and Aflalo, 2007),
interpretable as low-level chunks or schemata (Norman and
Shallice, 1986) for use in the construction of more complex,
compound overt activity. Neuronal activity in more rostral areas
of frontal cortex, including prefrontal cortex (PFC), have been
repeatedly shown to correlate with maintenance of goals for and
control of such higher-level activity, with signs of hierarchical
neuronal organization (Badre and D’Esposito, 2009), but the
details of how this organization implements selection and control
of actions are far from settled. It has been argued that rather than
assuming an exact correspondence between neuronal hierarchies
and task hierarchies, higher neuronal hierarchical levels could in
general encode task goal representations that are to be sustained
over longer time scales (Uithol et al., 2012).
Indeed, the idea of PFC being involved in sustaining neuronal
activation over time has a long tradition, and also here both
perception and action selection fit nicely within the same general
framework, of PFC coming into play when something has to
be kept active which could not otherwise sustain itself. Typical
examples include working memory, for planned motor actions
or perceptual representations to be maintained without any
bottom-up sensory input (Fuster, 2000; Curtis and D’Esposito,
2003), as well as non-routine mappings between stimulus and
response (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Deco and Rolls, 2005),
see Figure 1C. One hypothesis is that the to-be-sustained
information or sensorimotor pathways themselves reside in more
posterior brain networks, but that they need excitation from PFC
to achieve sustained activity (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Curtis
and D’Esposito, 2003; Postle, 2006). In line with this idea, it
has for example been shown that a classifier trained to decode
from visual cortex fMRI data what visual stimulus a subject is
seeing can also decode what stimulus is being kept in working
memory (Harrison and Tong, 2009), clearly suggesting that the
neural activity encoding a visual stimulus in working memory is
to some extent the same as when actually seeing the stimulus.
Within the context of visual perception, the dorsolateral region
of PFC (DLPFC), in the middle frontal gyrus, has repeatedly
been implicated in paradigms where subjects make an effort to
select and sustain a certain visual percept, for example during
periods of no visual input or distracting inputs (Fuster, 2000;
Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003; Feredoes et al., 2011), in situations
with ambiguous, bistable stimuli (Raz et al., 2007; de Graaf et al.,
2011), or in mental imagery (Ishai et al., 2000; Schlegel et al.,
2013).
Finally, there are similarities between perception and overt
action also when it comes to learning. Rewards lead to
the adoption of those overt behaviors and stimulus-response
mappings that are beneficial to the individual in its given
environment. Important here are loops between the cortex
and the basal ganglia, where reward-dependent release of
dopamine in the striatum determines neural plasticity (Yin
et al., 2008; Gurney et al., 2015), and notably such reward-
gated corticostriatal loops seem equally important when learning
perceptual classification of stimuli into categories (Seger and
Miller, 2010; Cantwell et al., 2015). Learning can also be of
a Hebbian, associative form, where neurons that have been
concurrently active strengthen their mutual connections. Such
learning, with the hippocampus as an important structure both
for storage and for consolidation of connections elsewhere,
has been well-studied when it comes to long-term memory of
sensory events (i.e., episodic memory; Henke 2010) but also
seems to occur in learning of motor sequences (Schendan
et al., 2003; Albouy et al., 2008). Additionally, cortico-cortical
associative learning has been suggested as a mechanism
for late-stage consolidation of acquired abilities, both within
perception (Ashby, 2013) and motor control (Ashby et al.,
2010).
In sum, a picture emerges in which the brain seems to be
controlling both what is perceived and what is overtly done in
roughly the same ways, schematically summarized in Figure 1D.
Specific activation patterns encoding specific percepts or overt
actions entering in biased competition with other, incompatible
percepts and actions, in a converging functional hierarchy
which is at least at its lower levels reflected in a hierarchical
neuronal organization. The nodes in the functional hierarchy and
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their interconnections arise from reward-based and associative
learning, and an important role of PFC is to support sustained
maintenance of node activation when needed.
This is, of course, an extremely simplified description of brain
function, and there are sure to be many finer points where
perception and action selection differ in their implementation.
In general, however, it makes sense that the brain might
capitalize on the same mechanisms to optimize both motor
and perceptual activity; both are equally crucial for ensuring
the organism’s survival and reproduction. Most overt actions
depend on perception (perceive the lion, then sneak away from
it), similarly to how some overt actions depend on other overt
actions (get the apple out of the tree, then eat it). Furthermore,
for the present purposes the shared framework outlined above
seems useful in at least three ways:
(i) It allows the suggestion that activation patterns (nodes
in the functional hierarchy) could be referred to with a shared
term, regardless of whether they encode percepts or overt actions.
Based on the idea that both are learned and selected to optimize
for survival and reproduction, the shared term that will be
adopted here is behavior. Thus, an individual can be regarded
as capable of both overt behavior, when exhibiting externally
observable bodymovement, and covert behavior, when exhibiting
neuronal activation encoding percepts or overt actions, that may
or may not be immediately associated with body movement. One
of the aims of this paper is to show that using the term behavior
in this way establishes a mindset that can lead to more fruitful
discussions of consciousness. (ii) The framework clarifies inmore
operational detail what one might mean by claiming perception
to be a type of behavior, as some authors have (Skinner, 1984;
O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Pierce and Cheney, 2004). (iii) It will
serve as the basis for the narrative behavior model to be sketched
in the next section.
3. A Model of Selection of Covert and Overt
Narrative Behavior
Now, the following is defined:
Narrative behavior: A behavior which can be interpreted, by
a third-party observer, as a communication, to one or more
recipients, of some aspect of how the behaving individual is
currently classifying the state of the world (including the individual’s
own body).
Such narrative behavior can be overt, such as when an individual
speaks (or signs, or writes) statements like “my foot hurts” or
“there is a lion in the bushes over there,” typically with one or
more other individuals as the recipients. Narrative behavior can
also be covert, in which case the recipients are simply all the parts
of the individual’s brain to which the involved neurons project.
It should be noted that it is not required that these recipients
“understand” what is being communicated, in the sense of
understanding as we attribute it to entire individuals. In Dennett’s
(1978) terms, a covert narrative behavior and its reception take
place on the subpersonal level, whereas “understanding” is a
phenomenon on the personal level.
Then, by the definitions adopted in this paper, perception
is clearly a case of covert narrative behavior, or, considering
what was said in the previous section, typically an entire set of
concurrent covert narrative behaviors, on different hierarchical
levels. For simplicity, I will separate this hierarchy into one lower
and one higher level, which I will refer to as quasi-depiction
and quasi-description, respectively (Kosslyn, 2005, also employed
the depiction-description distinction). Consider an example,
illustrated in Figure 2A: If I foveate a lion hiding in bushes, I
will exhibit low-level narrative behaviors communicating about
edges, colors, and orientations corresponding to various features
of the lion, the bushes, and so on. Taken together, these
narrative behaviors could be likened to a “depicting” of the
visual scene being processed, but the qualifier “quasi” in quasi-
depiction intends to emphasize that the purpose of these low-
level communications is not for them to be assembled into a
“full picture” somewhere else in the brain. The totality of all
concurrent quasi-depictions can in itself be considered a kind
of “full picture,” but it is not needed for what will follow here
that this totality is ever received somewhere and integrated into
something less parallel (cf. Dennett, 1991, e.g., p. 135).
At higher hierarchical levels, the covert narrative behaviors
communicating about the scene with the lion will start becoming
less like depictions, and more like verbal descriptions. This
could amount to classification of quasi-depictions into learned
concepts, such as LION or BUSHES. It is further assumed
here that also a concept such as IN can be communicated
at this quasi-descriptive level (e.g., in the form of an image
schema; Lakoff 1987; Rohrer 2006), allowing composition of
narratives like LION IN BUSHES. Here, the qualifier “quasi”
intends to emphasize that while these covert narrative behaviors
are language-like, in the sense of operating with concepts and
some compositionality, they are not fully articulated verbal
descriptions, expressed in overt or covert speech. For lack of a
better means, quasi-descriptions will be referred to here using
capitalized words or sentences, and they could be understood
as related to the constructions hypothesized in some cognitive
linguistics approaches (Goldberg, 2003; Feldman, 2006), but it
is not necessarily the case that quasi-descriptions always have
an easily identified counterpart in language. Furthermore, when
such counterparts in language do exist, such as the words
“lion” and “bushes,” it should be noted that in a convergent
hierarchy of narrative behaviors both of these words may well be
associated with a range of quasi-descriptions, such as for example
BUSHES(1), BUSHES(2), and so on, of which the sensory stimuli
at hand will activate only one (or perhaps a few?). For this
reason, the word “bushes” will be an imperfect approximation
of the activated BUSHES(i), just as BUSHES(i) will be an
imperfect approximation of the specific quasi-depictions that
triggered it.
It is proposed here that quasi-descriptive narratives account
for some types of perceptual completion phenomena (Pessoa et al.,
1998), such as in Dennett’s (1991, 1992) oft-mentioned example
with a wallpaper of identical images of Marilyn Monroe. When
glancing upon such a wallpaper, only one or a few portraits will
be sensed with high resolution at the fovea; the non-foveated
portraits will not be distinguishable from colored blobs, yet the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 803
Markkula Consciousness: perception as covert behavior
A
B
FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the narrative behavior model. (A) Roles of
quasi-depictions and quasi-descriptions (with rough cortical locations
indicated for the visual modality) as well as a task definition behavior, in
an example situation where a subject is to provide a verbal description
of what he or she is seeing. An arrow to a bracket indicates a
one-to-many association. The dashed line from DLPFC (dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex) to the quasi-depictions indicates uncertainty whether or
not DLPFC involvement would be needed in this situation. (B) As above,
but now the subject has been asked to say whether or not he or she
sees the lion.
“perceptual experience” is that of an entire wall of identical
Marilyns. Dennett argued that the brain should not need to “fill
in” the remaining Marilyns anywhere in the brain; it should be
enough for the brain to just draw a conclusion on a symbolic level
that, here, can be understood as a quasi-description A WALL
FULL OF MARILYNS, and that this is enough to account for the
“perceptual experience” in question. Experimentally, perceptual
completion phenomena have in some cases been found to be
associated with actual neural filling-in (e.g., De Weerd et al.,
1995), in other cases not (e.g., von der Heydt et al., 2003), and
in some cases a neural filling-in at lower levels seems to depend
on feedback from higher levels (Sterzer et al., 2006), interpretable
as feedback from quasi-description to quasi-depiction.
To finalize the example with the lion (Figure 2A), based on
a quasi-description such as LION IN BUSHES, I may come
to articulate a verbal description of what I see, either overtly
or covertly (in terms of brain function, the two may be rather
closely related; Scott et al., 2013). The reason why I might select
to generate an overt description is at least in this specific case
most probably reward-related. For example, someone may have
asked me to describe what I am currently seeing in a photo,
and I thus seek the social reward of complying with instruction.
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Alternatively, I may really be in person on the savannah together
with someone, such that there is a clear survival aspect to
communicating my observation. In either case, the process can
be understood as a high-level behavior DESCRIBE WHAT I AM
SEEING having become activated, possibly implemented in PFC
or maintained in sustained activity with excitation from PFC.
This type of behavior will be referred to here as a task definition
behavior. Considered in isolation, this is not a narrative behavior,
but the overt speech act that it causes (“There is a lion in the
bushes”) clearly is.
4. A Heterophenomenological Analysis of
Consciousness: When do We Tend to Say
that we have a Conscious Experience?
If, after giving my overt verbal report about the lion in the
bushes, someone asks me whether I have “a conscious experience
of seeing the lion” or “a conscious visual experience of the
lion,” I am likely to answer in the positive. Why is this? In
this section, the narrative behavior model will be applied in a
heterophenomenological analysis, to begin with of the the special
case of “seeing.” In practice, this will amount to introducing a set
of hypotheses on what is required for an individual to admit to be
seeing under various circumstances. These proposed hypotheses,
in effect operational definitions of what “seeing” means, will then
be generalized across sensory modalities, to consciousness in
general.
If someone asks me “do you see the lion?,” and I answer yes,
this has to depend on some acquired concept of mine of what it
means to “see.” In the terms of the model introduced above, just
as one can hypothesize quasi-descriptions LION and BUSHES,
one can hypothesize a quasi-description I AM SEEING, which
is excited whenever I engage in covert narrative behavior of a
visual nature. Specifically, the following operational definition is
proposed:
“Seeing”:We tend to say that we see X when we attempt to describe
X by means of covert narrative behaviors providing visual detail
about X, and find ourselves acceptably capable of doing so.
This needs clarification. As illustrated in Figure 2B, what is
proposed is that a question “do you see the lion?” activates a task
definition behavior that we can label SAY WHETHER I SEE A
LION, which involves (i) a singling out of the quasi-descriptions
I AM SEEING and LION, (ii) an attempt to activate, top-down,
quasi-depictions that associate with these quasi-descriptions, and
(iii) a mapping from a sufficient concurrent activation of I AM
SEEING and LION to a SAY YES behavior. The top-down
excitation of narrative behaviors that associate both with I AM
SEEING and LION is thus an example of an “attempt to describe
X by means of covert narrative behaviors providing visual detail
about X.” In line with what has been said above, this attempt is
suggested to require PFC activation, to keep the SAYWHETHER
I SEE A LION complex active, and perhaps also DLPFC to single
out and bias further specific quasi-depictions directly. If I am
already looking at the lion when the question is asked, some of the
lion-associated visual quasi-depictions may already be active, but
if the top-down excitation triggered by the question is successful,
the total amount of such activation will increase, resulting in
enough bottom-up excitation to push the SAYWHETHER I SEE
A LION complex to a threshold of activation where the SAY YES
behavior is generated. The reaching of this threshold is thus an
example of me “finding myself acceptably capable” of generating
the “covert narrative behaviors providing visual detail about X.”
Regarding the “narrative behaviors providing visual detail,”
assumed to excite I AM SEEING, which are these? One answer
could be “any narrative behavior that is implemented along
the brain’s visual pathways.” However, as suggested by O’Regan
and Noë (2001), a more accurate account might instead link
I AM SEEING to narrative behaviors obeying sensorimotor
contingencies of a visual type; i.e., narrative behaviors that change
in typical, predictable ways in response to for example eye
movements.
The above account of what I do before confirming to be
seeing the lion clarifies further how seeing could be likened to
an overt behavior, since my judgments of my own attempts at
overt behavior can be modeled in much the same way. If I am
monitoring my own success at whistling, for example, this can
be described in the present model as attempting to activate a
quasi-description I AM WHISTLING, associated with specific
quasi-depictions that encode the auditory and perhaps lip and
tongue-related somatic sensations of successful whistling. (There
is an illustration of this example in Figure 5A.) The less my
exhaled air sounds like hissing and instead like a tone, the more
the whistling-related quasi-depictions will become activated, the
more activated I AM WHISTLING will be, and the more likely
I will be to admit success. In other words, admitting to seeing
the lion requires producing enough of the neuronal activations
that associate with I AM SEEING and LION, just as admitting to
whistling requires producing enough of the neuronal activations
that associate with I AM WHISTLING. The major difference
is that only in the latter case are there concurrent externally
observable effects, such that a third party can also provide
judgment of success or failure.
What if there is a delay between a stimulus and a question
regarding my perception of it? (This is often the case in
contrastive experiments on the NCC, as will be exemplified
further below.) Suppose, for example, that I am only briefly
shown the photo with the hiding lion, and then asked the
question: “Did you see the lion?” For this type of case, a
modification to the operational definition above is proposed, as
follows:
“Just having seen”:We tend to say that we just saw X when
we attempt to describe X by means of covert narrative behaviors
providing visual detail about X, and, with the support of short-term
visual memory, find ourselves acceptably capable of doing so.
In other words, it is suggested here that admitting to just
having seen the lion also requires that I find myself acceptably
capable of covert narratives describing the lion, the important
difference being that now these covert narrative behaviors have
to be activated without bottom-up input. As has been discussed
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previously, such top-down-only maintenance of recently active
covert visual narratives seems to require DLPFC involvement.
Another aspect to note is that without bottom-up input, the
threshold for what is an acceptable level of visual detail might
very well be lower, perhaps more so the longer the duration
between stimulus and question.
If this temporal duration starts outgrowing the “just having
seen” denomination, why not even with other stimuli in between
(e.g., other photos, without any lions in them), a positive answer
to the question “did you see the lion?” could be hypothesized
to require only very imprecise reactivated covert narratives,
perhaps even at a more quasi-descriptive than quasi-depictive
level, i.e., simply LION without any details. Also, rather than
(or in addition to) being dependent on structures such as
DLPFC, one could hypothesize that such reactivation relies
on brain structures that have been implicated in longer-term
memory recall, in the form of episodic recollection or familiarity
(Yonelinas et al., 2005). The following operational definition
attempts to accommodate all of what has been said so far into
one, more general account of “seeing:”
Current or historical “seeing”:We tend to say that we see X (or
that we saw X) when we attempt to describe X by means of covert
narrative behaviors providing visual detail about X, and, with the
support of visual input (or visual memory at short or long time
scales), find ourselves acceptably capable of doing so (probably with
lower requirements for more historical X).
What about “consciousness,” then? It is suggested here that (i)
the above operational definitions of “seeing” can be modified to
definitions of “hearing,” “smelling,” “feeling,” and so on, simply
by replacing “visual detail” by “auditory detail,” “olfactory detail,”
“tactile/proprioceptive/nociceptive/... detail,” and so on, and (ii)
one will tend to admit “having a conscious experience” precisely
in those cases where one admits to one or more of “seeing” or
“hearing” or “smelling” or “feeling,” etc. Thus, in summary form,
one arrives at the following proposed operational definition of
“consciousness,” i.e., the following hypothesis on what it takes to
admit consciousness:
Current or historical “consciousness”:We tend to say that we have
a conscious experience of X (or that we had a conscious experience
of X) when we attempt to describe X by means of covert narrative
behaviors providing perceptual, as in visual/auditory/olfactory/etc.,
detail about X, and, with the support of current sensory input (or
memory of previous sensory events at short or long time scales)
find ourselves acceptably capable of doing so (probably with lower
requirements for more historical X).
The main difference between this account of consciousness and
most existing theories, is that it shifts the focus from around
the point in time Tx when X took place, to the time Tj when
we judge whether we are (for Tj = Tx) or were (Tj > Tx)
conscious of X. Under this view, there is no need to assume that
there are any neural correlates of consciousness in the way this
term is normally understood, i.e., there need not be any well-
defined, precise common denominator for all brain states that
will engender a concurrent or later report of consciousness. The
proposed common denominator lies instead in the moment of
introspection, where consciousness of present or past events will
be subjectively judged based on the ability for covert narrative
about them. However, even this common denominator could be
rather imprecise, given that the criterion for judgment may not
be constant, but instead relaxed over time, with variations also in
which brain mechanisms related to short or long term memory
are involved.
These differences between the proposed account and others
will be considered in more detail further below. First, however,
the proposed account will be tested against some existing
empirical data.
5. Application to Selected Empirical
Results
Here, three experiments from the literature will be described and
analyzed. These specific experiments have been chosen because
they have been previously used in arguments for competing,
rather different theories of consciousness and the NCC (the
theories as such will be discussed in the next section).
Consider, first, the study by Sergent et al. (2005), schematically
illustrated in Figure 3A, where subjects in an attentional blink
paradigm reported a characteristic low visibility of a target
stimulus T2 (a four-letter number word), when simultaneously
performing a discrimination task on a target stimulus T1 (one
of the two strings OXXO or XOOX), presented a stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA) interval earlier. As also illustrated in the
figure, using the narrative behavior model this phenomenon
can be understood as brain structures needed for establishing
a task definition behavior (including PFC) and top-down
biasing of quasi-depictions (DLPFC), becoming occupied with
discriminating and storing T1 after its presentation. During
this process, the T2 stimulus arrives and generates, bottom-
up, some quasi-depiction and quasi-description, consistent with
the early occipital and occipitotemporal activations that Sergent
et al. (2005) observed for both seen and unseen T2. When the
processing of T1 is complete, the brain reorganizes its activity
to accommodate the task on T2, at which point the bottom-up
activations for this stimulus may either have decayed too much,
leading to a report of non-visibility, or remain strong enough
to allow DLPFC-assisted maintenance, acceptable activation
of NUMBER WORD and I SAW quasi-descriptions, and the
consequent report of a visible T2. The latter sequence of events
would then correspond to what Sergent et al. (2005) observed
in the form of brain activations in temporal, frontal, cingulate,
parietal, and occipital regions (roughly in that time order) for
seen but not unseen T2. Note that this account of the attentional
blink is very similar to several existing, more detailed models
(Dehaene et al., 2003; Dux and Marois, 2009; Zylberberg et al.,
2010).
Next, consider the observations from the metacontrast
masking experiment of Lau and Passingham (2006, Figure 3B).
These authors found two SOAs between a target visual stimulus
(a square or a diamond) and a subsequent mask, at which
discrimination performance was the same, yet with different
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FIGURE 3 | Interpretation of findings from three contrastive
experiments on visual consciousness. Symbols as in Figure 2,
except in (A), where, to avoid clutter, mutual inhibition is in some cases
indicated by stacking behaviors on top of each other, rather than with red
lines. The inset in (B) shows one possible way in which the relationship
between quasi-depiction strengths might yield similar discrimination
performance across two stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), yet differing
reports of discrimination confidence. In each of the panels (A–C), a
schematic illustration is also given of the experimental paradigm, as well
as a rough indication of the main contrasts in brain activation that the
original authors found between stimuli reported as seen rather than
unseen.
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reported subjective confidence in the discrimination. Using the
narrative behavior model, the following interpretation can be
made: First, the temporal proximity of target and mask makes
unambiguous activation of the correct quasi-depiction difficult
(presumably through lateral inhibition in early visual processing;
Di Lollo et al., 2004), such that a possible dominance of the
target quasi-depiction may be rather weak. However, since the
subject has to make a forced choice of just one stimulus, the
task definition behavior REPORT “DIAMOND OR SQUARE?,”
has to converge to one of the two quasi-descriptions SQUARE or
DIAMOND, and this competition is biased toward the stimulus
that is more active than the other at the quasi-depictive level,
even if weakly so. Similar discrimination performance at two
different SOAs could then be understood as the two SOAs
generating relationships between the quasi-depiction strengths
that are functionally similar in this sense; for example as in
the inset in Figure 3B, where the relative difference between
quasi-depiction strength is preserved between SOAs.
Then, when reporting confidence in the discrimination just
carried out, the subject sustains, by means of top-down DLPFC
activation (that may well have been in place since the appearance
of the stimulus), the quasi-depictive activation just selected, and
judges whether it is strong enough for admitting to having
seen the stimulus. If (i) this judgment instead depends on
something more like the absolute strength of the selected quasi-
depiction, as suggested by the dashed threshold in the inset
in Figure 3B, and (ii) the two different SOAs identified by
Lau and Passingham (2006) differed in this more absolute
sense (for example because the different SOAs made certain
attributes of the stimuli differentially salient; see Jannati and
Di Lollo, 2012), then one can understand how performance
and confidence may dissociate in this paradigm. Furthermore,
if assuming reciprocal connections between DLPFC and the
quasi-depictions, this type of account also explains why Lau
and Passingham found that DLPFC activation correlated with
confidence but not with performance, as long as only higher
absolute levels of quasi-depiction result in higher absolute levels
of DLPFC activation. The interpretation presented here is also in
line with the finding of Rounis et al. (2010), that TMS to DLPFC
during this experimental paradigm reduces confidence ratings
without affecting discrimination performance; this manipulation
makes the subjects incapable of maintaining the quasi-depictions
active until the time of judging confidence.
Finally, consider the experiment by Pitts et al. (2012, see
Figure 3C), in which subjects were, in a first experimental block,
to respond with a button press to discs in their peripheral
visual field going dim, while fixating a centrally located large
matrix of frequently reorienting line segments. Unbeknownst to
the subjects, every now and then some of these line segments
aligned to briefly form a square pattern (pattern exemplified in
Figure 3C, but note that in this schematic illustration the pattern
seems less conspicuous than in the actual stimuli used by Pitts
et al.). After this first experimental block, subjects were shown
a number of line matrix patterns, including the square, and
asked whether they had seen them. Pitts et al. found that, when
originally presented, the square pattern had caused a measurable
early event-related potential, seemingly from occipital areas, in
all subjects. However, in those subjects who afterwards reported
having seen the square with some confidence, there was also
an additional, later potential, seemingly from more temporally
located parts of the brain. Signs of more frontal brain activations
were only observed in subsequent experimental blocks, where the
square pattern was made part of the subjects’ task.
Figure 3C provides an interpretation: In the first block,
the subjects complied with instruction by setting up and
maintaining a task definition behavior that mapped dim discs
to button presses. When the square pattern formed, all subjects
quasi-depicted it (the early, occipital activation), but more
semantic processing (the slightly later, more temporal activation),
understandable as a quasi-description SQUARE PATTERN,
occurred only in some subjects. Crucially, at this point the
subjects had no reason to sustain the quasi-depiction, e.g., by
engaging DLPFC, and discriminate or judge it. However, by
associative learning, the repeated association of a specific quasi-
depiction with the SQUARE PATTERN quasi-description left a
memory trace, giving these subjects a greater chance of later
reactivating the quasi-depiction, should this ever become needed.
And indeed, the need arose when Pitts et al. questioned the
subjects after the first block. As illustrated in the right part of
Figure 3C, the subjects’ response, at this point, about whether
they had seen the square pattern earlier, can be understood as
dependent on their ability to reactivate this quasi-depiction from
memory. In line with what was said in the previous section,
it could also be that this reactivation occurred at the quasi-
descriptive level. The exact mechanisms of this recollection
process are, however, not crucial here, as long as the reactivation
is facilitated by the SQUARE PATTERN activation during the
first experimental block.
Summarizing, the brain imaging contrasts for consciousness
were in all these three experiments based on a subjective question
of the type “did you see X?,” but the experiments by Sergent
et al. (2005) and Lau and Passingham (2006) differed in that
the latter authors also asked the question “what was X?,” and
used it as a control to filter away discrimination-related brain
activity that did not change with changing responses to the
“did you see X?” question. On the other hand, in both these
experiments this question on visibility was asked very shortly
after presentation of X, and was expected by the subjects,
meaning that the subjects could start engaging in introspective
judgment even before the question was asked. According to
the account proposed here, this early judgment is the reason
why both experiments showed DLPFC activity in their observed
neural correlates of later positive report. In contrast, the subjects
of Pitts et al. (2012) did not expect the question on visibility, and
the observed neural correlates therefore instead reflected such
stimulus-triggered quasi-descriptive activity that was sufficient
for a positive judgment once the question was asked, considerably
later. Thus, all of these findings can be qualitatively understood
using the model and hypotheses proposed here. As will be
clear from the next section, previous authors have argued that
one or the other experiment provides a more accurate test of
consciousness. The account proposed here rather suggests that
the different experiments simply engaged their subjects in self-
judgment of consciousness in different ways.
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6. Relation to Some Existing Accounts of
Consciousness
Dehaene et al. (2003, 2006, 2014) have argued for a global
neuronal workspace (GNW) theory of consciousness, originally
suggested by Baars (1988). The widespread brain activation
associated with reports of a visible T2 stimulus in an experiment
such as that of Sergent et al. (2005, Figure 3A) is, according to
this view, a signature of T2 processing entering the hypothesized
GNW, an interconnected set of areas across the brain with
the purpose of “flexible sharing of information throughout the
cortex [for example to] route a selected stimulus through a
series of non-routine information processing stages” (Dehaene
et al., 2014, p. 79). A flexibly mapped, non-routine reaction
to a stimulus, such as in the experiments discussed above, is
assumed to require that the stimulus first becomes conscious
by entering the GNW, making consciousness and the GNW
the bottleneck behind phenomena like the attentional blink or
the psychological refractory period (Marti et al., 2012). Indeed,
behavioral and neuronal aspects of these phenomena have been
well accounted for by computational modeling of such a central
“routing” resource (Dehaene et al., 2003; Zylberberg et al.,
2010). Put succinctly, in the GNW account, if I am to (flexibly,
non-routinely) respond to a stimulus, I first need to “see” it
consciously, and consciousness is a limited resource.
The model presented in this paper seems to be consistent
with the experimental data and modeling work used to support
the GNW hypothesis. What has been presented, here, as PFC-
mediated flexible mappings between stimulus and response
could be understood as identical to the flexible routing function
attributed to the GNW, and could presumably be modeled
precisely as by Zylberberg et al. (2010). The main difference
lies in the assumption, by Dehaene and colleagues, that this
type of central processing determines consciousness. According
to the GNW hypothesis, as soon as there is central processing,
consciousness (somehow) arises. According to the present view,
since central processing of a stimulus X increases the amount
of activation in the brain associating with X, perhaps including
DLPFC-assisted fixation of quasi-depictions of X as part of
the task at hand, such central processing would be associated
with improved concurrent and later ability of activating covert
narratives describing X. Therefore, central processing of X for
flexible, non-routine behavior will be something like a sufficient
condition for admitting consciousness of X, but not therefore a
necessary condition, as for example suggested by the experiment
by Pitts et al. (2012)1.
Lau and Rosenthal (2011) also argue against the GNW
view, and emphasize that dissociations between performance
in discriminating a stimulus and confidence in having seen
it, as observed by Lau and Passingham (2006, Figure 3B)
and Rounis et al. (2010), seem incompatible with the idea
of a global workspace mediating both flexible responding and
conscious perception. Instead, Lau and Rosenthal (2011) suggest
that the DLPFC activity associated, in these experiments, with
1In a later paper, Pitts et al. (2014) also argue that the brain activity they observe
does not seem consistent with the GNW hypothesis.
confidence in having seen the discriminated stimuli, reflects
metacognition about the subjects’ own mental states, in line
with higher-order theories of consciousness. In these theories,
phenomenal consciousness of X depends not on first-order
mental representations of X (e.g., in early visual areas), but on
higher-order representations, “that represent oneself as being in
the relevant first-order mental states” (Lau and Rosenthal, 2011,
p. 365; for an overview of alternative versions of higher-order
theory, see Carruthers, 2011).
In one sense, the view presented here is clearly in line with
the higher-order view. Here, it has been suggested that a subject
will admit seeing or having seen a stimulus X when he or she
succeeds in generating covert narratives providing visual detail
about X, to the extent that a quasi-description I SEE X or I
SAW X wins over its competitors (e.g., I DON’T SEE X or I
GUESSED X). Such quasi-descriptions can clearly be regarded
as metacognitive, representing the subject as being in the state of
“seeing X” or “having seen X.” Furthermore, just as suggested by
Lau and Rosenthal (2011), DLPFC has been implicated here as a
necessary component in this metacognition, at least in the case of
very recent historical X.
However, one can possibly discern an additional, unstated
assumption in the reasoning of Lau and Rosenthal (2011), that is
not a part of the framework proposed here: the view of conscious
awareness as something that “arises” in the moment (“How
does awareness arise?”, p. 366), with a well-defined, scientifically
identifiable correct answer as to what the contents of conscious
awareness are at a given point in time (“a second stage process
[...] determines what enters awareness,” p. 367; “In peripheral
vision [...] do we actually consciously experience vivid details of
color and shape, or mistakenly think that we do[...]?,” p. 371;
my italics in both cases)2. Differently put, this is the assumption
that the concept of neural correlates of consciousness, as it is
normally used, makes sense, something which could for example
be formulated as follows:
TheNCCassumption:When an individual is exposed to a stimulus
X at a time Tx, this may or may not give rise to a conscious
experience C(X) of this stimulus at a time Tc = Tx + ǫ, where ǫ
is some rather short duration, and if this conscious experience C(X)
occurs, it is because of a specific, well-defined neural correlate of
C(X) also occurring, in the brain, at time Tc.
The account proposed here does not assume that well-defined
conscious experiences C(X) are continuously generated in or by
the brain, for the subject to introspect and the neuroscientist
to detect. Rather, it is proposed that consciousness is only
ever subjectively judged, and that this judgment occurs in the
moments of introspection or remembrance, or at requests of
2Examples of similar formulations from other authors: “The content of
consciousness refers to the specific information that I am aware of at a given
moment.” (Dehaene et al., 2014, p. 76); “[...] the brain basis of the changing content
of consciousness [...]” (Tononi and Koch, 2008, p. 256); “This has fooled us into
thinking that we know what we are conscious of.” (Lamme, 2010, p. 204); “the
neural events reflected in the Nd1-Nd2 sequence may be adequate in themselves
to produce visual awareness” (Pitts et al., 2012, p. 297). According to the view
presented here, these quotes are all examples of a problematic way of talking about
consciousness.
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subjective reports. Thus, a possible divergence between what has
been proposed here and higher-order theories could occur in the
interpretation of an experiment such as that of Pitts et al. (2012).
If a higher-order theorist contends that the subjects who reported
having seen the square pattern in this experiment must have
engaged in metacognition when the pattern was presented (i.e., at
Tc ≈ Tx), since these subjects were apparently “conscious” of
the pattern, then that theorist is not in line with the present
proposal (and must explain the apparent lack of frontal brain
activity in response to the pattern). If, however, the higher-order
theorist holds that the metacognition, e.g., in the form of a quasi-
description I SAW THE SQUARE PATTERN, occurred at a later
time Tj, just after the time Tq when the question was asked, then
that higher-order theory and the account presented here align.
Another type of interpretation of the experiment by Pitts et al.
(2012) is that the more widespread and frontal brain activations
observed in experiments such as those by Sergent et al. (2005) or
Lau and Passingham (2006) reflect post-perceptual processes, for
example to prepare or carry out a subjective report (Aru et al.,
2012; Pitts et al., 2014). What has been said here partly aligns
with this idea, but nuances it by suggesting that some frontal
activations, not least in DLPFC, may be intrinsic and inescapable
components of “seeing” a presently or very recently available
stimulus, albeit not necessarily of “seeing” a stimulus that one is
asked about only later.
The NCC assumption, as defined above, and the type of
reasoning it often inspires is further illustrated in Figure 4.
The top half of the figure shows a low-level chain of causation
that most would probably agree on: At each point in time, the
state of the brain results from the immediately preceding brain
state, combined with immediately preceding external stimuli.
Furthermore, an overt behavior, such as a subjective report about
a stimulus, is the result of a specific brain state immediately
preceding the overt behavior. The bottom part of the figure
illustrates how authors operating under the NCC assumption
have in practice adopted a simplified view of this causation,
whereby a subjective report in a contrastive experiment is
construed as dependent not on the brain state following Tq, and
thus indirectly on the entire preceding sequence of stimuli and
brain events, but instead only on whether or not an assumed
NCC, with its associated conscious experience, was formed at Tc.
There is nothing wrong in general with making this type of
simplification. For example, within a given, fixed experimental
paradigm there might well be a clearly identifiable difference at
some Tc between brain states which do and do not engender
a later report of consciousness, for instance because of covert
introspective judgment carried out at Tc, such that Tj = Tc, or
some other threshold effect occurring somewhere in the brain
around this time. However, what is suggested here is that if
the experimental paradigm is modified, the same identifiable
difference in brain state at Tc, or the same threshold effect, might
no longer be what makes the difference for the report after Tq.
In summary: Under the NCC assumption, it suffices to know
the subject’s current brain state and the NCC for the percept
in question to know whether the subject is currently conscious
of it. Under the view proposed here, there is no well-defined
FIGURE 4 | A schematic illustration of a generic experimental
paradigm, where a subject reports at time Tq, on a target stimulus
that was presented at time Tx. All of the contrastive experiments
considered in this paper are of this general type. The green arrows in the
figure denote a low-level, uncontroversial path of causation, from one
stimulus and brain state to the next, and then to the overt subjective report.
The lower part of the figure, and the red arrows, illustrate how authors
operating under what has here been called the NCC assumption often reason
as though a brain state at a putative moment Tc of conscious experience is
what causes, and therefore should be sought in order to explain, the
subjective report at Tq. The account proposed here instead links this report
to the outcome of a judgment of consciousness by the subject, at a time Tj
which, depending on the exact experimental paradigm, may occur either in
response to the stimulus, or in response to a question about the stimulus.
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answer to the question of what a subject is conscious of at any
one given time; one also has to specify (at least) when the subject
will be asked about his or her perceptual experience, what other
stimuli will be presented before that point in time, and whether
the subject knows that the question is coming. This critique of
the NCC assumption comes close to what has been argued by
Blackmore (2012, 2015). It is also similar to Dennett’s rejection
of the idea of a “Cartesian Theater” in the brain, at which the
information in conscious experience would come together for
the benefit of... “whom? The Queen?” (Dennett, 1991, p. 255).
In general, the present account seems to stay roughly within the
theoretical perimeter circumscribed by Dennett’s multiple drafts
theory (Dennett, 1991) and his “fame in the brain” metaphor
(Dennett, 2001), but what has been proposed here delimits these
further with a more precise model and definitions.
There is compatibility and partial overlap also with the
sensorimotor account of O’Regan and Noë (2001). It has already
been pointed out that their view and the present one share
the same emphasis on perception as behavior, and that the
type of sensorimotor contingency that a specific quasi-depiction
obeys could be (part of?) determining the subjective modality of
that quasi-depiction, i.e., which of the quasi-descriptions I AM
SEEING, I AM HEARING, etc. that the quasi-depiction tends
to activate. In general, O’Regan and Noë’s foundational concept
of “mastery of the laws of sensorimotor contingency” fits well
as an aspect of the present concept of quasi-depiction; it could
be proposed that one part of quasi-depicting one’s environment
is precisely to make predictions of how the bottom-up sensory
input from this environment will change as new motor actions
are performed. However, O’Regan and Noë (2001) did not take
the model-based, heterophenomenological approach that has
been adopted here.
7. Understanding “Qualia:” Why do We
describe Our Conscious Experience the
Ways We Do?
One objection that could be raised against all of the theories
of consciousness discussed above, including the one being put
forth here, is that they are physicalist (Stoljar, 2009) theories,
which some would say concern themselves too unilaterally with
third-person observations of overt reports and brain activity,
and too little with subjective, first-person experience (Nagel, 1974;
Jackson, 1982; Chalmers, 1995; Block, 2009): “So what,” one
might reason, “if your NCCs or your heterophenomenological
theory can predict exactly under what circumstances I will tend
to say that I am having what conscious experiences, I want to
understand why I have any experiences at all, and why they feel
the way they do to me!”
A possible approach to these matters is to take the narrative
behavior model, imagine an organism functioning in accordance
with it, and discuss what such an organism, assuming that it has
language abilities, would have to say about its own first-person
experience. To begin with, consider this organism engaging in a
rich variety of behaviors, both overt and covert. Some of these
behaviors may be more or less obviously innate to the organism,
for example breathing, moving an arm to reach an object, or
the covert narrative behavior of quasi-depicting a specific hue of
green. Other behaviors may bemore obviously learned behaviors,
such as for example whistling, or generating the covert quasi-
description LION for a certain class of visual stimuli.
For all of these behaviors, whether covert or overt, innate
or learned, there are a number of things which can happen in
conjunction with them. For instance, by means of mechanisms
for familiarity or episodic memory, the organism may recognize
that it has engaged in similar behavior before. As has been
discussed above, another effect of similarity across multiple
occasions (e.g., repeatedly seeing lions) is that it shapes
the narrative behavior pyramid, by establishment of new
quasi-descriptions in the functional hierarchy, with a one-to-
many association to nodes at lower levels. In practice, this
amounts to a form of labeling of the organism’s own behaviors,
which as discussed previously could occur either together with
learning of actual words in a shared language, or without any such
association.
The other side of similarity, recognition, and labeling, is
discrimination of differences, for example between two quasi-
descriptions LION and CAT. This ability of discrimination is
present also at lower, quasi-depictive levels, for example as
discrimination between examples within a quasi-description:
discrimination between two different lions, two different hues of
green, two different ways of reaching for an object.
In sum, the narrative behavior machinery is capable of
creating narratives about the fact that the organism is doing
something, whether this is something that the organism has
done before, when it is different from another something, and
the narrative behavior machinery also puts different labels on
different somethings, which may or may not be associated with
words in a language. In general, however, the machinery does not
have any privileged access to what, in more detail, the organism is
doing, or how it is doing it3.
However, for overt behaviors, which by definition cause
externally observable effects, the organism will generally be able
to provide at least cursory answers also to the what in detail and
how questions. Consider, again, the example of whistling: Once
the organism can say of itself “I am whistling” (i.e., once it has
successfully activated a quasi-description I AM WHISTLING),
it can proceed to observe its own lip positioning, tongue
movements, and exhalation, and since there are commonly
agreed words for all of these things in the language it shares with
other individuals, the organism can construct an explanation of
what it is doing when it is whistling (and such explanation from
others may also have been part of how the organism acquired the
whistling skill to begin with). However, for successful whistling
performance the organism still need not be anywhere near a
detailed description of the shape of its lip aperture, exactly where
it is putting its tongue, how much air pressure it is applying, and
definitely not of what brain structures and neurons are involved.
If the organism is particularly inquisitive and motivated, and has
3In Wittgenstein’s (1967) terms, the narrative behavior machinery can state that
there is something in the box, and it can choose to call it a beetle, but that is as far
as it can go.
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access to appropriate observational technology, it can certainly
proceed toward such descriptive ability. If the organism does so,
it will in the end (since, ex hypothesi, it functions according
to the narrative behavior model) find that what is required for
itself to admit to being whistling is a certain pattern of neuronal
activation (I AM WHISTLING), which in turn is activated by a
constrained set of other activation patterns, presumably related
to quasi-depictions of tones and of the involved overt, muscular
activations; see Figure 5A.
Now, compare the above to a situation where the organism
could say of itself “I am seeing green,” illustrated in Figure 5B.
The organism could mount a similar research project to
understand this phenomenon, with a very similar final
conclusion; a certain pattern of neuronal activation (I AM
SEEING GREEN) being activated by a constrained set of
other activation patterns, in this case quasi-depictions of the
color green. However, due to the lack of externally observable
effects such as lip movements and exhalations, this latter research
project would have to start at amuchmore scientifically advanced
level, involving light of a certain frequency and receptors in
the retina. Therefore, if the organism does not undertake and
complete these two research projects, the organism could come
to think rather differently of seeing green than of whistling. With
whistling, as with overt behavior in general, the organism knows
when it is doing it, and may feel that it has a rather good grasp of
how it is doing it (even though in fact it ignores most of what is
going on). With seeing green, as with covert behavior in general,
the organism also knows when it is doing it, but it is more or
less clueless as to how. For this reason, the organism might not
think about covert narrative behaviors, such as those involved in
“seeing green,” as behavior at all, not at all as “doing” something,
but may instead use other words, for example “perception,”
“subjective experience,” or “subjective state,” to describe “seeing
green” and other phenomena that only involve covert behaviors.
Lacking the third-party perspective of a scientifically advanced
empirical research project, the organism can nevertheless, from
within its own first-person perspective, reach some conclusions
about its “perception” or “subjective state,” i.e., about its own
covert narrative behaviors. For example, the organism can pick
up on the converging nature of the narrative behavior hierarchy.
Since it is capable of discriminating between, say, different hues
of green, the organism can detect that the overt statement “I am
seeing green” is a very crude approximation of what it is actually
“perceiving:” The organism can discriminate between when I
AM SEEING GREEN(i) is active, as opposed to I AM SEEING
GREEN(i + 1), as well as between individual and even more
specific quasi-depictions, and it can therefore conclude that there
are details regarding its “subjective state” which are “private,” as in
available to itself, from its own first-person perspective, but not to
the third-person perspective of other individuals, and “ineffable,”
as in not possible to fully communicate to other individuals.
Furthermore, a certain green color will trigger a very
specific complex of quasi-depictions and quasi-descriptions,
with associated activations of for example color-specific
predictions of how the narratives will change with motor
activity (i.e., sensorimotor contingencies), or weak activations
of color-specific episodic memories, which might in turn evoke
subtle color-specific emotional responses. The specificity of
this compound reaction is detectable to the organism from
its first-person perspective, in the sense that the organism can
react with familiarity to the entire complex; the organism can
note that all the “somethings” come in their usual grouping,
FIGURE 5 | An illustration of how the narrative behavior model
describes a judgment of whether or not one is engaged in a certain
behavior, be it an overt one such as whistling (A) or a covert one such
as seeing a green color (B). In both cases, what is required for a positive
judgment is sufficient activation of those covert behaviors that associate with
the quasi-description in question (I AM WHISTLING and I AM SEEING
GREEN, respectively). However, only in the overt case are there also
externally observable components and results of behavior, which permit the
behaving individual to construct a coarse explanation of how it is achieving
the behavior in question.
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i.e., I AM SEEING GREEN(i) is accompanied by the same
quasi-depictions, diffuse emotional responses etc., as usual.
When the organism detects this specificity, it could, if it thought
of its perception as behavior, make a statement like “I am doing
something very specific when this green color is presented to
me.” However, without this perspective, the organism might
rather say “I see this green color in a very specific way” or “there
is something very specific which it is like for me to see this color,”
and, if the organism is of the philosophically inclined sort, maybe
also things like “I will call the specific way I see this green color a
quale, and use the word qualia to speak, in general, of the specific
ways I see things, hear things, smell things, etc.”
A final characteristic of the narrative behavior machinery
that the organism could surmise is that it is really something
quite astonishing. The “seeing green” example above, although
complex in its own right, is simplistic compared to what the
organism is otherwise doing all the time, every day: Continuously
constructing, completely without words in a language, an
extremely rich,multi-level narrative about what is going on inside
and outside of its body, and all of this without the slightest
bit of insight for the organism into how it is being achieved,
just that it is. The situation can to some extent be compared
to that of overlearned overt behaviors that have been acquired
mainly by practice, like for example whistling or riding a bike,
where one can, if one thinks about it, marvel at being capable
of doing something without really understanding how. This is
an appropriate type of awe for the narrative behavior organism:
“Astonishingly, from my first-person perspective I know that I
am continuously constructing an extremely rich covert narrative
about what it is like to be me, but I do not know at all how
I am doing it.” However, without having made the connection
between perception and behavior, instead relying on concepts
like “qualia” or “my private, ineffable, subjective experience,” the
organism may instead formulate the same sense of awe thus:
“Astonishingly, from my first-person perspective I know that I
have an extremely rich, continuous, subjective experience of what
it is like to be me, but I do not know at all what this subjective
experience is or how it arises.”
From our third-person perspective, we can see how this
way of talking sets the organism up for confusion. It is now,
vaguely, discussing its “subjective experience” as something that
one “has,” something that “is” something, or something that
“arises,” all implying that the “subjective experience” exists in
some sense. This is not necessarily incorrect as such, but what
is not at all clear from the organism’s choice of words is that
if its “subjective experience” exists, it is in the same way as
for example “biking” exists: as a class of behavior, where each
candidate instance of behavior can be judged by an observer as
belonging to the class or not. This is a special kind of emergent
existence, different (at least in degree) from how physical objects,
like for example the body or the bike, exist, and in this sense
the organism would not be entirely mistaken if it considered
its “subjective experience” to exist in a non-physical way, or
felt unsure regarding its physicality. An impression of non-
physicality could be further bolstered by the fact that in contrast
with “biking,” the “subjective experience” is without direct traces
in the external, physical world, and detectable only to the
organism itself. One can therefore not blame the organism if it
meets with incredulity the statement that this seemingly non-
physical “subjective experience” is, deep down, just patterns of
neuronal activations, and expresses this incredulity as there being
a fundamentally hard problem of consciousness to be solved
(Chalmers, 1995), or an explanatory gap to be bridged: “the
experience of green is a subjective state, but brain states are
objective, and we do not understand how a subjective state could
be an objective state or even how a subjective state could be based
in an objective state” (Block, 2009, p. 1113, with credit to Nagel,
1974). From our third-person perspective, however, we see that a
“subjective state” arising for the narrative behavior organism, out
of its “objective state” of neuronal activity, is, while astonishing
and scientifically challenging in many ways, not considerably
more so than “a state of biking” arising out of neuronal
activity.
In sum, it has been argued here that if an organism that
functions in accordance with the narrative behavior model tries
to describe those characteristics of its own covert narrative
behavior that it can detect from a first-person perspective, it could
come up with concepts like “qualia” or “subjective experience,”
and be quite perplexed by them. To the extent that the narrative
behavior model is a close enough account of what is going on in a
human brain, the argument above could hold also for explaining
the human tendency for such concepts and perplexedness.
Partially related arguments have been made before (Dehaene and
Naccache, 2001; Dennett, 2001; O’Regan and Noë, 2001), but
the narrative behavior model provides additional structure to the
reasoning.
8. Conclusion and Outlook
Of what has been said here, two points stand out as the most
important:
(1) The suggestion that instead of assuming that there are
general and identifiable neural correlates of consciousness at
Tc, the putative moment of conscious experience, (what has
here been referred to as the NCC assumption), any general
common denominator is instead to be sought at Tj, the
moment of judging the conscious experience. Specifically,
it has been suggested that an individual will admit to a
conscious experience of X at time Tx ≈ Tc if at time Tj the
individual finds itself acceptably capable of covert narrative
behavior describing X, with increases in Tj − Tx probably
leading to lowered thresholds for what is acceptable, and
to changes in what brain mechanisms are involved in the
judgment. Note that this point does not hinge upon the view
of perception as behavior; the previous sentence could just
as well be reformulated as “if at time Tj the individual finds
that it can establish an acceptable perceptual representation
of X.”
(2) The suggestion that talking about perception as behavior,
i.e., not replacing “covert narrative behavior about X” with
“perceptual representation of X” above, can be helpful
in dispelling some of the sense of mystery surrounding
consciousness. Perhaps the main benefit of this change of
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semantics is that it casts perception as one region within
a spectrum of differences in degree, rather than as a
fundamentally distinct phenomenon. On this view, humans
engage in narrative behavior describing what it is like to
be themselves along a full range from overt narratives in a
shared language, via language-like covert narratives where
the units of description are not words in a language, but
comparable to such (here referred to as quasi-description),
all the way to covert narratives where the unit of description
is more specific, for example comparable to fragments of a
picture (here referred to as quasi-depiction). Furthermore, it
can help to think of a human detecting that it is engaged in
covert narrative behavior as doing something very similar to
detecting that it is engaged in an overt behavior, in both cases
with equally limited ability of determining, from its first-
person perspective, how it is performing these behaviors.
These two main points have been supported by a number
of auxiliary arguments, all of which could individually be
further developed: The proposed similarity in neural mechanisms
between perception and action selection could be investigated
in more detail, perhaps starting from existing theories of brain
function which emphasize the question of how perceptual and
motor systems relate to each other (e.g., Cisek, 2007; Adams
et al., 2013). Note, however, that the main point (2) above does
not depend on perception and action selection being supported
by exactly the same mechanisms. If they were, it would be very
clear that we ought to refer to the two with one single term, for
example “behavior”. If the two are instead just roughly similar
(which seems more probable), we can absorb perception into the
term behavior and use this way of talking as a possible handle
on consciousness, all the while acknowledging that covert and
overt behavior are slightly different types of behavior, just as one
might discern subtypes of overt behavior, with differing neural
underpinnings.
Furthermore, the narrative behavior model introduced to
make point (1) above had to cover a very wide range of
phenomena, from low-level sensory processing to language;
basically all of the so called “easy problems” of consciousness
(Chalmers, 1995). Consequently it has been necessary to keep this
model rather simplistic and approximate. In its current boxes-
and-arrows form it nevertheless has many similarities to existing,
quantitatively defined models (Dehaene et al., 2003; Zylberberg
et al., 2010). Such quantification and simulation could allow a
more exact specification of the model, as well as a more rigorous
test of another supporting argument; that the narrative behavior
model is compatible with all of the three experiments considered
in detail here, to a greater extent than for example the global
neuronal workspace and higher-order theories.
This empirical grounding can also be further extended,
by considering additional experiments from the literature, or
carrying out new ones. One possible direction would be to study
neural events not only at Tc ≈ Tx, but also close to the time Tq
of requesting the actual subjective report. The account proposed
here suggests that at Tq, subjects will try to recreate covert
narrative behaviors that occurred in response to the stimulus,
and if so the neural signatures of their doing so should correlate
better with the actual report than what any neural signatures at
Tc ≈ Tx do. Especially so if subjects do not know beforehand
what stimulus they will be questioned about (as in the experiment
by Pitts et al., 2012), such that the actual judgment occurs at Tj ≈
Tq rather than at Tj ≈ Tx, but it is possible that the predicted
effect could exist also in the latter case, if the introspective
judgment persists all the way up toTq. Another line of inquiry has
already been hinted at above: At modifications of a contrastive
paradigm, for example with respect to the time Tq − Tx, or
what happens during this time, the present account predicts
shifts in what neural signatures at Tc ≈ Tx correlate best with
subjective report at Tq. Such shifts, for which the experimental
data reviewed here provide some support, should be especially
notable if the paradigm modifications cause a change in what
brain mechanisms are involved in judging the own ability of
narrative behavior; from trying to see an ambiguous currently
available stimulus (Tj = Tx), to maintaining or recalling a
very recently presented stimulus, to recognizing a stimulus that
was presented a longer while ago. But it is also possible that
even minor experimental modifications, such as small changes to
Tq−Tx, could engender slight shifts in observed neural correlates.
Again, experimental paradigms that do not instruct subjects on
exactly what stimuli they will be asked about later could be
especially useful.
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